Блог публикации публикувани от cassiopeia walk-in
This led to a variety of TCP/IP stacks being offered up for DOS and Windows, but it
wasn’t until 1995 that Microsoft made the bold move of including their own native TCP/IP stack in
Windows 95, and with that the internet was born…
bitcoin core :
along with all timestamp
servers shared the basic functionality of periodically collecting things into blocks
hashing them into a chain.
P2P file sharing, and services like Napster, and
subsequently Bittorent which spun out of Mnet.
Mnet itself was a peer to peer file sharing service that
employed a digital currency called Mojo, which in a fully distributed network provided an incentive
against attacks, one of the first "smart contracts."
Sending by IP requests a new public key, so yes, it's vulnerable to type 1 man-in-the-middle.
If that's a concern, sending to a Bitcoin address doesn't have that vulnerability,
although there's a small privacy tradeoff.
I have a feeling most of the time people will get Bitcoin addresses off of non-SSL websites and
unsigned cleartext e-mail, which is already vulnerable to type 1 and type 2 through DNS poisoning.
One solution would be to use both the IP and Bitcoin addresses
when sending (maybe 220.127.116.11- 1Kn8iojk...),
where the recipient uses the public key of the Bitcoin address to sign
the new public key to prove that you're sending to who you think you are.
If the system starts to be used for real business purposes, I will certainly implement that.
Another solution is to use SSL.
For now, it's pretty obvious that if you send to an IP, you didn't give any other identifying information
about the recipient, so you're blindly sending to whoever answers that IP.
Then strong encryption became available to the masses, and trust was no longer required.
Data could be secured in a way that was physically impossible for others to access,
no matter for what reason,
no matter how good the excuse,
no matter what.
SHA-256 is very strong.
It's not like the incremental step from MD5 to SHA1.
It can last several decades unless there's some massive breakthrough attack.
Northern Powergrid генерира стабилни приходи в размер на 1 млрд. долара и печалба в размер на 300 млн. долара всяка година. Berskhire е активна и на застрахователния пазар в Лондон. dir.bg
норма на печалба = 30%(300/1000) - спер измама
Northern Powergrid = 3,9 мил клиенти
£1000 мил /3,9 мил клинети = £ 256 годишна сметка за ток
а реалноста е £ 600 годишна сметка на 1 клиент
получава = (-60%) по-малко приходи от 1 клиент(от £600 на £256)
печели = +30% ????
съотношението годишен доход:годишен наем: цена на имота = 3:1:10
we were short Herbalife, and when Bill put his first report out the stock was down almost 50% in a matter of days.
And at that point we just determined the risk reward had changed dramatically.
That unless we felt the FTC or someone else was going to immediately move to crimp their business, that 2 other multi-level marketing ideas that we were also short – which didn’t move as much,
they were only down a little bit – actually were much better uses of our capital at that point.
bank opened a client account to an address never connected with 'Conepay International?' Have $WDI notified German authorities of this
iban de 2951230800000075079
Parker Petite told Investors how great his Fraudulent Business = Fraudsters lie all the time..
The CEO of Wirecard is on a very slippery slope..
Агостин Антонио - пенсиониран рибар с очудване получава писма за Conepay International в своята малка къщичка наследена от майка му.
ConePay една от много "компании" която на документи е подизпълните на WIRECARD
ФАЛШИВИ ПРИХОДИ(фалшиви печалби) :
Полвината приходи на Wirecard произхождат от 100 подизпълнители които нямат лиценз
ConePay(на адрес на обикновеният работник Агустин Антонио) на 3 часа от манила е създала на документи милони евро приходи за Wirecard’s Singapore които приходи НЕ са събрани !
Търговската полиция на Сингапур разследва директора на Wirecard Singapour за създаване на фалшиви приходи от фалшиви компании.
СИНГАПУРСКАТА правна фирма Rajah & Tann е открила доказателства за измами и пране на мръсни пари в Wirecard Singapour.
BaFin забрани късите продажби върху акции на Wirecard за стабилност на немската икономика.
Предишното име на ConePay е било Махсоne с адрес на малка автомивка (Sаm's Autoworx) в южното гето на Манила сити - след запитване местните власти каза че никога не и имало такава фирма на такъв адрес.
Директори на Wirecard забравя/губили фактури и фабрикували приходи през Wirecard singapour чрез вземане на дълг от трети фирми .
Frank and Betty Lusk( late 80s) = were pressured into buying a $150,000 timeshare
$19,000 = yearly maintenance fees by Diamond Resorts.
The salesman showed them documents he wouldn't let them keep and didn't mention the high maintenance fees that appeared in the final contract,
Changes In Inventories 210,900 Changes In Other Operating Activities 950,400
Fooling Some of the People All of the Time(Einhorn’s book) :
investigator = bumbling idiot for asking such a question
Lehman(repo 105) = massive fraud for precisely the same reasons that Allied was a massive fraud(failed to mark down its real estate assets to “fair value,)
corrupt law firm Milberg Weiss filed a class action lawsuit against Allied that almost precisely mimicked Einhorn’s allegations.
Milberg = filed a class action lawsuit against nearly every company attacked by short sellers in the Milken network.
A couple of years ago,
Milberg’s top partners = went to jail after prosecutors determined that the partners routinely bribed the plaintiffs in such lawsuits and knew in advance that some event would collapse the stock prices of the companies named in the lawsuits.
Business Loan Express = subsidiary that represented a tiny fraction of Allied’s overall portfolio.
The BLX executives were apparently handing out Allied’s money to unqualified borrowers who were their cronies(Allied was the victim of BLX fraud)
Allied Capital = purchased by Ares Capital Corporation, a company that was founded by Anthony Ressler and John Kissick – both partners in the private equity firm Apollo Management. The head of Apollo is none other than Leon Black, who is Michael Milken’s closest business crony. That could be a coincidence.
Or it could be that Einhorn’s attack on Allied was meant from the beginning to drive down Allied’s stock price to the point where it would be ripe for a takeover by Milken’s pals.
Einhorn mysteriously ended his “crusade” agains Allied as soon as Allied was purchased by his friends.
U.S. mortgage-bond market was huge = bigger than the market for U.S. Treasury notes/bonds.
entire economy stability = depended on house prices continuing to rise( asset bubbles can only be recognized in hindsight)
“There are specific identifiers that are entirely recognizable during the bubble’s inflation.
The FBI reports mortgage-related fraud is up 5fold since 2000.”
housing-related fraud = integral in our nation’s institutions
M Burry was betting on his theory of human behavior:
the loans were structured to go bad.
Now, in November, they were actually going bad.
MORtgage(created in early 2005)
might have a 2-year = “fixed” rate of 6%
in 2007 = would jump to 11% and provoke a wave of defaults.
loans would grow louder with time, until eventually a lot of people would suspect, as he suspected, that
loans = were bombs.
no one would be willing to sell insurance(CDS) on subprime-mortgage bonds.
He needed to lay his chips on the table now and wait for the casino to wake up and change the odds of the game.
A credit-default swap on a 30-year subprime-mortgage bond = was a bet designed to last for 30 years, in theory.
He figured that it would take only 3 to pay off.
one of the sellers appeared to care very much which bonds they were insuring.
He found one mortgage pool that was 100% floating-rate negative-amortizing mortgages—where the borrowers could choose the option of not paying any interest at all and simply accumulate a bigger and bigger debt until, presumably, they defaulted on it.
Goldman Sachs not only sold him insurance on the pool but sent him a little note congratulating him on being the first person, on Wall Street or off, ever to buy insurance on that particular item.
A giant number of individual loans got piled up into a tower.
The top floors got their money back first and so got the highest ratings from Moody’s and S&P, and the lowest interest rate.
The low floors got their money back last, suffered the first losses, and got the lowest ratings from Moody’s and S&P.
Because they were taking on more risk, the investors in the bottom floors received a higher rate of interest than investors in the top floors. Investors who bought mortgage bonds had to decide in which floor of the tower they wanted to invest,
Michael Burry wasn’t thinking about buying mortgage bonds.
He was wondering how he might short, or bet against, subprime-mortgage bonds.
very mortgage bond came with its own mind-numbingly tedious 130-page prospectus. If you read the fine print, you saw that each bond was its own little corporation.
Every mortgage bond came with its own mind-numbingly tedious 130-page prospectus. If you read the fine print, you saw that each bond was its own little corporation. Burry spent the end of 2004 and early 2005 scanning hundreds and actually reading dozens of the prospectuses, certain he was the only one apart from the lawyers who drafted them to do so—even though you could get them all for $100 a year from 10kWizard.com.
The subprime-mortgage market had a special talent for obscuring what needed to be clarified. A bond backed entirely by subprime mortgages, for example, wasn’t called a subprime-mortgage bond. It was called an “A.B.S.,” or “asset-backed security.” If you asked Deutsche Bank exactly what assets secured an asset-backed security, you’d be handed lists of more acronyms—R.M.B.S., hels, helocs, Alt-A—along with categories of credit you did not know existed (“midprime”). R.M.B.S. stood for “residential-mortgage-backed security.” hel stood for “home-equity loan.” heloc stood for “home-equity line of credit.” Alt-A was just what they called crappy subprime-mortgage loans for which they hadn’t even bothered to acquire the proper documents—to, say, verify the borrower’s income.
All of this could more clearly be called “subprime loans,” but the bond market wasn’t clear.
“Midprime” was a kind of triumph of language over truth. Some crafty bond-market person had gazed upon the subprime-mortgage sprawl, as an ambitious real-estate developer might gaze upon Oakland, and found an opportunity to rebrand some of the turf.
Inside Oakland there was a neighborhood, masquerading as an entirely separate town, called “Rockridge.”
Simply by refusing to be called “Oakland,” “Rockridge” enjoyed higher property values.
Inside the subprime-mortgage market there was now a similar neighborhood known as “midprime.”
e interest-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime mortgage.
You, the homebuyer, actually were given the option of paying nothing at all, and rolling whatever interest you owed the bank into a higher principal balance.
It wasn’t hard to see what sort of person might like to have such a loan: one with no income.
What Burry couldn’t understand was why a person who lent money would want to extend such a loan. “What you want to watch are the lenders, not the borrowers,” he said.
“The borrowers will always be willing to take a great deal for themselves. It’s up to the lenders to show restraint, and when they lose it, watch out.”
By 2003 he knew that the borrowers had already lost it.
By early 2005 he saw that lenders had, too.
uple of years earlier, he’d discovered credit-default swaps. A credit-default swap was confusing mainly because it wasn’t really a swap at all. It was an insurance policy, typically on a corporate bond, with periodic premium payments and a fixed term. For instance, you might pay $200,000 a year to buy a 10-year credit-default swap on $100 million in General Electric bonds. The most you could lose was $2 million: $200,000 a year for 10 years.
The most you could make was $100 million, if General Electric defaulted on its debt anytime in the next 10 years and bondholders recovered nothing. It was a zero-sum bet:
if you made $100 million, the guy who had sold you the credit-default swap lost $100 million. It was also an asymmetric bet, like laying down money on a number in roulette.
The most you could lose were the chips you put on the table, but if your number came up, you made 30, 40, even 50 times your money.
“Credit-default swaps remedied the problem of open-ended risk for me,” said Burry. “If I bought a credit-default swap, my downside was defined and certain, and the upside was many multiples of it.”
Wallst -glass is half full
This pro forma cash EPS, which by the way was just multiples of its real cash flow, was just one for the ages.
For a couple of us on the team who are a little bit older than the others, we saw parallels to some of the great rollups of the late 90s and early 2000s.
So I think that was helpful for us.
So a lot of these rollups, they truly have to get Wall Street to believe that 2+2=5 for a short period of time.
When in fact the way they do deals, 2+2 = often 3.5.
Well I’m always wary of accountants who become CEOs too.
That’s always a bad sign for me.
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